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Abstract
International Differences in the Family Gap in Pay: the Role of
Labor Market Institutions1
Using microdata for 35 countries over the period 1985-1994-2002 we find that
labor market institutions traditionally associated to more compressed wage
structures are associated to a higher family gap. Our results indicate that these
policies reduce the price effect of having children but aggravate the human
capital loss due to motherhood. We also find evidence that policies that help
women continue in the same job after childbirth decrease the family gap. Of all
the countries we study, mothers in Southern Europe suffer the biggest family
gap and our analysis indicates that this is due to the bad combination of labor
market policies in these countries. Our results are robust to specification
changes and indicate that the main reason mothers lag behind other women in
terms of earnings is the loss of accumulated job market experience caused by
career breaks around childbirth.
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11 Introduction
In the last thirty years the Spanish fertility rate has decreased fifty percent and is
today one of the lowest worldwide. The Spanish population froze between 1989
and 1993 and decreased in absolute numbers in 1991 (I.N.E. 2006). At the same
time, a growing percentage of young and middle age Spanish women joined the
labor market, in an astonishing increase of the female participation rate from
28.8% in 1975 to 45.7% in 2005 (I.N.E. 2006). The case of Spain clearly
suggests that the functioning of labor markets is an important determinant of the
cost of having children and of fertility decisions. It has been argued for example
that high unemployment and unstable contracts, common in Southern Europe,
raise the cost of having children and depress fertility, particularly among
younger women (Adserà 2002). More generally, the different institutional
framework of labor markets across countries can be an important determinant of
the differences in the labor cost of having children internationally and there is
evidence that the wage penalty associated to motherhood varies quite
substantially across countries. For example, among the thirty five countries we
analyze in this study the mean and the standard deviation of the estimated family
gap in earnings – the difference in earnings between mothers and other women –
is .21 and .18 log points respectively. In this paper we investigate the role of
labor market institutions to explain the differences in the earnings gap between
mothers and non-mothers internationally.
Several studies have looked at the family gap internationally (Davies & Pierre
2005, Todd 2001, Harkness & Waldfogel 1999, Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel
2004). These studies find that the family gap varies considerable across
countries, but none has looked in detail at the role of labor market institutions in
explaining these differences. Gornick et al. (1997) compares fourteen OECD
countries, as of the middle-to-late 1980s, with respect to their provision of
policies that support mothers' employment, but that study does not draw a link
between these institutions and the family gap. Our paper is the first attempt to
study empirically the relationship between the family gap and the regulation of
labor across a large sample of countries. We calculate the family gap in thirty
five different countries and we test the relationship between these family gaps
and the different regulation of labor in each country during the period 1985-
1994-2002.
2The effect of labor market institutions on the family gap is ambiguous. Reasons
for the difference in earnings between mothers and non-mothers include a price
effect, a human capital effect and a heterogeneity effect (Waldfogel 1998b).
According  to  the  price  effect,  one  reason  mothers  lag  behind  other  women  in
terms of earnings is that firms pay women with children a lower wage compared
to other women, even after controlling for individual characteristics. This price
effect could reflect the lower effort exerted by mothers in their jobs or instead
could be due to employers’ discrimination against mothers. According to the
human capital effect of motherhood another reason there is a gap between the
earnings of mothers and non-mothers is that women with children accumulate
less human capital (job market experience) because they interrupt their careers
to take care of children (Erosa et al. 2002).
Labor market institutions such as the minimum wage and collective bargaining
coverage can attenuate the price effect of motherhood by setting a floor on
wages received by mothers. In the case of the human capital effect, the impact of
labor market institutions on the family gap is more ambiguous.2 3 Labor market
institutions such as parental leave and job protection regulations can reduce the
family gap by lowering the frequency of job transitions around childbirth.
However, too generous parental leave can lead to long periods out of
employment and a large loss of experience (Waldfogel 1998), and too strict
firing restrictions or too high wage floors can lead to unemployment (Nickell
1997, Siebert 1997), which would increase the duration of job interruptions. We
find that tenure enhancing institutions, such as parental leave, job protection
regulations and restrictions to the use of temporary contracts, are associated to a
lower family gap. We also find that wage compressing institutions, such as
2. Lundberg & Rose (2000) find that job interruptions due to motherhood cause the time devoted to
work by the husband to increase, partially offsetting the negative effect on the mother’s earnings.
3. A third explanation for the family gap results from an heterogeneity bias, since it is possible that
being a mother is correlated with other variables, unobservable, that affect the earnings potential
of a particular woman. In this case, the estimated family gap would simply reflect the effect of
these unobservable variables on the earnings potential of mothers but not necessarily the fact that
having children depresses wages in itself. In this paper we use cross-sectional data and hence we
are not able to quantify the extent of heterogeneity bias in our sample. However, since our
analysis consists of a cross country comparison, all we need is that the correlation between
unobservable variables and motherhood, as well as the distribution of the former in the
population, is similar across countries.
3unemployment benefits and trade union coverage, are instead associated to a
larger family gap. Furthermore, our results indicate that this type of policies
reduce the price effect of motherhood but are associated to a larger human
capital loss.
Our paper relates also to the literature that has studied the link between labor
market institutions and the gender gap. We use the same data set and
methodology to estimate the family and the gender gaps, which allows us to
compare the effect of the same group of labor market institutions on each of
these gaps. In a study of the gender gap in twenty two countries, Blau and Kahn
(2003) use the same dataset as ours and find that labor market institutions that
compress the wage structure overall also tend to reduce the wage gap between
men and women. Other studies have concluded that a reduction of the family
gap would cause the gender gap to fall as well (Waldfogel 1998, Waldfogel
1998b, Millimet 2000) since a large percentage of women are also mothers
(60% in our sample).
We argue that labor market institutions can have very different effects on the
earnings differential between men and women on the one hand and women with
children and non-mothers on the other. One key difference between mothers and
non-mothers is that mothers’ labor turnover is much higher than that of non-
mothers (Anderson et al. 2003, Data & Smith 2002, Phipps et al. 2001, Klerman
& Leibowitz 1994). The literature has also found a close link between past
decisions about labor market participation and women’s current wage level
(Eckstein & Wolpin 1989, Altû & Miller 1998) with a particularly strong effect
in the case of job interruptions due to motherhood (Gronau 1988, Korenman &
Neumark 1992). Furthermore, these effects tend to persist in time because
turnover probabilities depend negatively on tenure and experience (Topel &
Ward 1992). All this literature suggests that tenure enhancing policies will
reduce the family gap to a larger extent than the gender gap and that wage
compressing policies can have opposing effects on the two gaps if they result in
high unemployment which hurts high turnover workers such as mothers the
most.
Our detailed analysis of the link between labor market institutions and the
gender and family gaps confirms these hypotheses. We find that wage
4compressing institutions have a markedly different impact on the family gap and
on the gender gap. In particular, we find that while the gender gap decreases
with the intensity of wage compressing institutions, these institutions are
associated to a bigger family gap, with a particularly strong effect for collective
bargaining coverage. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2
describes the data we use in this paper. Section 3 describes the analytical
framework.  Section  4  shows  the  results.  In  section  5  we  test  the  robustness  of
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Data
In this study we use two types of data: microdata to estimate the gender and
family earnings gap, and data on the intensity of various labor market
institutions across countries. The data on labor market institutions is explained
in  detail  in  the  next  section.  In  relation  to  the  data  that  we  use  to  estimate  the
gender and family gaps, we use microdata for thirty five countries from the
1988, 1994 and 2002 annual files of the International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP). The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) is a continuing
annual program of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics in
different areas. Each year, the ISSP administers a common set of basic
demographic information questions, such as age, education, gender, income,
employment status, marital status, etc. This common set of questions is
complemented every year by additional questions on a different topic of social
interest. In the years 1988, 1994 and 2002, the ISSP conducted the ‘Family and
Changing  Gender  Roles’  studies,  which  in  addition  to  the  common  set  of
questions, asked respondents questions related to motherhood, childbearing and
job market interruptions around childbirth.
5Table 1
List of countries and years. ISSP data. ‘Family and Changing Gender Roles’ study.
Country Years Area Earnings Sample Size – all
women*
Australia 1994, 2002 Liberal Annual gross wage and salary
income (1994)
Monthly net income (2002)
790
Austria 1988, 1994 Continental Monthly net income (1988)
Monthly net earnings (1994)
784
Belgium 2002 Continental Net monthly income 709
Brazil 2002 Other Monthly earnings 1,016
Bulgaria 2002 Eastern Monthly net income 623
Chile 2002 Other Monthly net income 843
Cyprus 2002 Other Annual income 506
Czech Republic 1994, 2002 Eastern Monthly net income 818
Denmark 2002 Nordic Annual gross income 752
Finland 2002 Nordic Monthly income 745
France 2002 Continental Monthly earnings 1,259
Germany (East) 1988 Eastern Monthly net income 569
Germany (West) 1988, 2002 Continental Monthly n et income 1,092
Hungary 1994, 2002 Eastern Monthly gross earnings (1994)
Monthly income (2002)
815
Ireland 1994 Liberal Weekly net earnings 575
Israel 1994, 2002 Other Monthly earnings (1994)
Monthly net income (2002)
688
Italy 1988, 1994 Southern Monthly net income 529
Japan 1994, 2002 Other Annual gross earnings 659
Latvia 2002 Eastern Monthly net income 576
Mexico 2002 Other Earnings 888
Netherlands 1988 Continental Annual net earnings 984
New Zealand 1994, 2002 Liberal Annual gross income 593
Norway 1994, 2002 Nordic Annual gross earnings (1994)
Gross income (2002)
960
Philippines 2002 Other Monthly income 600
Poland 1994, 2002 Eastern Monthly net earnings 797
Portugal 2002 Southern Monthly net income 649
Russia 1994, 2002 Eastern Monthly net earnings 1,187
Slovak Republic 2002 Eastern Earnings 589
Slovenia 1994, 2002 Eastern Monthly regular income 574
Spain 2002 Southern Monthly earnings 1,285
Sweden 1994, 2002 Nordic Monthly gross earnings (1994)
Monthly gross income (2002)
628
Switzerland 2002 Continental Monthly earnings 514
Taiwan 2002 Other Earnings 1,007
United Kingdom 1988, 1994, 2002 Liberal Annual gross earnings 1,098
United States 1988, 1994, 2002 Liberal Annual gross earnings 778
* When a country appears more than one year in the data the number in the column is the average sample size across
years.
6The advantage of the ISSP data is the large number of countries for which there
is information: thirty five in our sample. Its disadvantage is the small size of
some country-year samples, although the ISSP questions are asked of a
probability-based nation-wide sample of adults. In section 4 we describe the
methodology that we use in this study, which we think helps to overcome the
potential problems of the small sample sizes.
Table 1 shows the list of countries, the years each country appears in the data
and the earnings concept being asked in the questionnaire. The third column also
includes our own labeling of each country into six groups. Throughout the paper
we present results for each of these groups of countries. As can been in the table,
in the ISSP respondents report earnings differently depending on the country.
While in some countries respondents report earnings before taxes in others they
report earnings after taxes. In our initial models we included a dummy variable
indicating whether the earnings concept was gross or net of taxes. This dummy
variable was never significant for the estimation of the family or the gender
gap.4 Also, for some countries, the earnings are top coded. When this was the
case, we followed two alternatives: to either drop these observations from the
analysis, or to assign to each the lower bound of the income interval. In each
case we obtained practically identical results and we present here the results
with these observations dropped.
The ISSP data does not give information on the number of weeks worked.
However, respondents report the number of hours worked per week, which we
used to fit earnings regressions conditional on part-time or full-time
employment, where part-time employment is defined as working less than 35
hours per week.
In relation to the human capital variables, we were able to construct years of
education for each individual in each country. With respect to labor market
experience, we don’t have information about years of experience or job tenure.
We constructed potential experience combining the information on years of
education  and age  of  the  individual. Although years of  experience and/or  job
4. Blau and Kahn (2003) report similar results in their study that also uses the ISSP data for years
1985-94, which suffers from similar variation in the way the earnings concept is reported.
7Table 2
List of countries and information on labor market institutions.
Country Parental
Leave
Job
Protection
Temporary
Contracts
Trade Union
Coverage
Unemployment
Benefits
Minimum
Wage
Australia X X X X X X
Austria X X X X X X
Belgium X X X X X X
Brazil X
Bulgaria X
Chile X
Cyprus
Czech
Republic X X X X X
Denmark X X X X X
Finland X X X X X
France X X X X X X
Germany
(East)
Germany
(West) X X X X X
Hungary X X X X X
Ireland X X X X X
Israel
Italy X X X X X
Japan X X X X X X
Latvia
Mexico X X X X
Netherlands X X X X X X
New Zealand X X X X X
Norway X X X X X
Philippines X
Poland X X X X X
Portugal X X X X X X
Russia X
Slovak
Republic X X X X X
Slovenia X
Spain X X X X X X
Sweden X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X
Taiwan X
United
Kingdom X X X X X X
United States X X X X X X
TIME-
VARYING NO YES YES YES NO YES
8tenure are both important determinants of the earnings of mothers and non-
mothers, our focus here is on quantifying the earnings gap between mothers and
other women, and on relating that gap to various labor market institutions. A
different question of course, is to what extent the existing gap is due to a price
effect or to a human capital effect, a question that we do not attempt to answer
here.
With respect to the labor market institutions, in this study we look at two groups
of institutions and construct time-varying measures of each one for as many
countries as possible. Table 2 shows for each country, whether there is
information available on each labor market institution and whether the variable
is time-varying.
First, we look at institutions that potentially help mothers continue with the
same  job  after  a  child  is  born.  In  this  group,  we  construct  measures  of  the
following three policies: parental leave, impediments to the firing of workers
and restrictions to the use of temporary contracts by firms. Information about
these policies comes from the O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001) in the case
of parental leave and the O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004) in the case of
job protection regulations. The Data Appendix shows detailed information of
each one of these policies for each country in our sample.
We use two measures of parental leave policies, the maximum duration of
parental leave (in weeks) and the earnings replacement rate while on leave. For
the protection of jobs, we use an index of the overall strictness of protection of
regular contracts and an index of the restrictions on the use of temporary
contracts. The first index combines information on various aspects of the
protection of workers under regular contracts against dismissal (indefinite
contracts), such as the period of advance notice, administrative obstacles to the
dismissal of workers, the level of severance payments and cases considered
unfair dismissal (usually subject to higher severance payments). The index on
the restrictions to the use of temporary contracts or fixed-term contracts –
usually subject to low or no protection against termination – measures to what
9extent and in which cases temporary contracts are valid according to the law.5 In
the case of job protection measures, the information is time varying, with data
given for the eighties, nineties and two thousands, and we assign the value for
the eighties to observations in the ISSP dataset for 1988, the value for the
nineties to observations for 1994 and the value for two thousands to
observations for 2002.
Theoretically, the impact of parental leave on the family gap is ambiguous
(Waldfogel, 1998). On the one hand, parental policies help mothers continue
with the same employer/job after childbirth, allowing women with children to
accumulate job market experience and/or maintain firm specific human capital.
On the other hand, generous parental leave might induce mothers to stop
working for longer periods than otherwise, with the corresponding bigger loss of
human capital.
The impact of job protection regulations on the family gap is also ambiguous.
Job protection regulations help mothers continue with the same employer after
childbirth and since they benefit mothers as long as they continue working, they
discourage job interruptions. However, job protection regulations, if too strict,
can lead to unemployment because in the presence of strict firing procedures
firms become too cautious in the hiring process, and in the presence of
unemployment, mothers that decide either voluntarily or involuntarily to
interrupt their career to take care of children might go through a longer job
interruption than otherwise. Furthermore, in dual labor markets workers with
regular contracts benefit from strict firing restrictions while workers under
temporary contracts get low or no protection against dismissal (Dolado et al,
2005). The restrictions to the use of temporary contracts are important here,
because in some countries firms easily get around the strict regulation of regular
contracts by employing a worker under a series of consecutive temporary
contracts. When there is the possibility of using temporary contracts, job tenure
is important to gain access to a protected job, because the law usually establishes
5. The O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004) provides information on other aspects of the
regulation of temporary contracts such as the maximum number of contracts that can be signed
consecutively by the same firm and workers. The effect of these on job transitions is less clear
than that of the index we use here and we found these other aspects to be non-significant when
we included them in our models.
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a limited duration and limited number of consecutive fixed-term contracts. In
this context, it is possible that mothers, with lower average tenure than non-
mothers, disproportionately concentrate in the secondary market, under
temporary hence unprotected contracts.
The second type of labor market institutions we consider is traditionally
associated with wage compression, that is, with a lower wage gap between
various groups of workers, such as male and female (Blau and Kahn, 2003). In
this group we gather information about the following institutions: collective
bargaining coverage, unemployment benefits, and the minimum wage. We get
the information on the minimum wage from the O.E.C.D. minimum wage
database, which reports the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage for
1986 and 2000. We assign the 1986 value to observations in the ISSP for 1988,
and the 2000 value to the observations for 1994 and 2002. We get the
information on collective bargaining coverage from the O.E.C.D. Employment
Outlook (2004), which reports time varying measures of union coverage, for the
eighties, the nineties and the two thousands. Having time varying information is
important here because of the changes in many O.E.C.D. countries during the
eighties and nineties in the direction of lowering the power of unions (Nickell
1997, Siebert 1997). Information on the level of unemployment benefits was
taken from Botero et al., (2004). This is a one-time index of the generosity of
unemployment benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the
duration of unemployment benefits, covering all except one of the thirty five
countries in our sample.
The effect of wage compressing institutions on the family gap is also
ambiguous. The bargaining of wages by unions and the minimum wage may
raise the relative wage of mothers, provided that women with children are at the
bottom of the wage distribution. Unemployment benefits may help mothers who
stopped working and want to return to the labor market to get a higher wage
than otherwise by allowing them to search longer and find a better match.
However, these institutions may lead to unemployment causing mothers who
decide to transition out of employment to suffer a long career break.
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between these various labor market
institutions. On average countries with stricter protection of regular jobs also
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have more generous parental leave policies, more generous unemployment
benefits and more powerful unions. Furthermore, stricter protection of regular
contracts is on average coupled with fewer restrictions on the use of temporary
contracts by firms, a clear indication of dual markets with respect to job
protection. As we will se next, this positive correlation between policies is
important to understand the weak association between the gender and the family
gaps across countries.
Table 3
Correlation coefficients. Labor market institutions
LEAVE PROTECTREG RESTRICTEMP COVERAGE UBENEFITS
LEAVE 1
PROTECTREG 0.4627 1
RESTRICTTEMP -0.1653 -0.3152 1
COVERAGE 0.3545 0.4197 -0.409 1
UBENEFITS 0.6727 0.3018 -0.0996 0.2837 1
Notes:  LEAVE indicates the duration of the parental leave period; PROTECTREG indicates the strictness of
regulations governing the firing of workers with regular contracts. RESTRICTEMP indicates the strictness of
restrictions on the use of temporary contracts by firms. COVERAGE indicates trade union coverage.
UBENEFITS indicates the generosity of social benefits to the unemployed.
3 Analytical Framework
Our  empirical  analysis  consists  of  two  steps.  In  the  first  step  we  estimate  the
family gap in each of 35 countries using the microdata available. In the second
step, we estimate reduced form specifications with the family gap as the
endogenous variable and the various types of labor market institutions as
explanatory variables.
With respect to the estimation of the family gap, we follow the methodology of
Blau and Kahn (2003) which uses the same dataset as ours to analyze the gender
gap in twenty two countries.6 We start by using individual data to estimate log
earnings equations separately for mothers and non-mothers for each country j
and year t:
ijtjtijtjtijt
ijtjtijtjtijtjtjtijt
eKKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbbEARN
+×+×+
+++= 3210ln
(1)
6. For a more detailed description of this methodology see Blau and Kahn (2003), pp. 115-123.
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where i indexes individuals; lnEARN is the natural log of earnings; PART is a
dummy variable for part-time employment, defined as working less than thirty
five hours per week; HRPART and HRFULL are interactions of weekly work
hours with part-time and full-time status; X is a vector of explanatory variables,
including the usual human capital variables of education, potential experience
and  the  square  of  potential  experience;  KIDS  is  a  vector  of  four  dummy
variables included in the earnings equations of mothers only, indicating whether
the mother has one child, two children, three children or four or more children.
Unfortunately, the ISSP data does not give information on the number of
children so we had to estimate this variable combining information on the
marital status of women and the number of members in the household. Since we
identify children as long as they live with their mother in the same household,
we  restricted  our  sample  to  women  younger  than  50  years  of  age.  Having
estimated (1), we compute the family gap in pay in each country and year as
follows:
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
×+×+
+++
-
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
×+
+++
=
MjtMUStMjtMUSt
MUStMjtMUStMjtMUStMjtMjt
NMjtNMUSt
NMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMUStNMjtNMjt
jt
KKIDSBX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
BX
HRFULLbHRPARTbPARTbb
FAMILYGAP
3210
3210
(2)
where  NM  refers  to  non-mothers,  US  refers  to  the  US  values  and  M  refers  to
mothers. According to equation (2), FAMILYGAP is an estimate of the gap in
earnings between mothers and non-mothers in each country and year on the
assumption that the group of mothers and non-mothers in each country-year
microdata file have the same average levels of measured characteristics (i.e.,
PART,  HRPART,  HRFULL,  X  and  KIDS  variables)  as  the  group  of  U.S.
mothers and non-mothers for that year. Equation (2) provides a simulated family
gap that removes the effect of differences in observable characteristics across
countries. However, labor market institutions can still have an effect on the
family gap in at least two ways. First, labor market institutions can be important
for the different returns to the same characteristics for mothers and non-mothers.
Second, since differences in measured characteristics between mothers and non-
mothers remain (at the U.S. level) labor market institutions that affect the price
of these characteristics will play a role in determining the family gap.
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In relation to the human capital effect component of the family gap, equation (2)
allows for institutions to play a role with respect to job market experience. The
reason is that the X vector includes potential experience (age - education years -
six), instead of actual experience. We then remove cross country differences in
potential experience, but not in actual experience. Suppose for example that in
country j job protection is weak and because of this mothers lose their job
frequently and spend a lot of time out of employment when children are born. In
equation (2) the coefficient of potential experience would be relatively low,
compared to another country. In general, when the coefficient of potential
experience is low this could mean either that returns to experience are low or
that mothers accumulate less experience. This will be true in general for all
variables potentially correlated with actual experience, such as the number of
kids and possibly part-time status. With respect to the other variables in X
besides potential experience (education, part-time status and the number of
kids), equation (2) does not allow for cross country differences in these variables
to play a role. When we estimated the family gap allowing for cross country
differences in these variables to play a role we obtained very similar results,
although noisier in general. We think that removing international differences in
observable characteristics (with the exception of actual experience) is an
advantage of our methodology because in many cases the size of the country-
year  samples  are  too  small  for  the  distribution  of  X’s  in  our  data  to  be
representative. Besides, our hypothesis is that the most important effect of labor
market institutions on human capital variables is their impact on the
accumulation of job market experience.
With respect to the reduced form specifications, our sample consists of 54
country-year observations. Following Blau and Kahn (2003), we start by
running regressions of the family gap on two measures of male wage dispersion.
The hypothesis here is that observed male wage inequality is influenced by both
heterogeneity of productivity characteristics and by the returns to these
characteristics, being the effect of labor market institutions more important in
the latter. The two measures of male wage dispersion remove then the effects of
international differences in measured heterogeneity. First, for each country and
year we take the U.S. sample of men for that year and compute a predicted log
wage for each U.S. male using the coefficients from the wage regression for
country j and year t. We then compute two measures of wage dispersion: the
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standard deviation of low wages (SD) and the standard deviation of the residuals
(SDRES). These two measures give us an idea of the degree of wage inequality
in country j at year t that results from the returns to measured and unmeasured
characteristics in that country and year:
jtjtjtjtjt eYYEARbSDRESbSDbFAMILYGAP +×+×+×+= 210 (3)
where YEAR is a vector of year dummies and e is the error term. We then turn
to the reduced form specifications that include the various labor market
institutions we are interested in. All of our models include year dummies and
take the following specification:
jtjtjtjt eYYEARBIINSbFAMILYGAP +×+×+= 0 (4)
where INS is a vector of explanatory variables indicating the level of the various
labor market institutions; YEAR is a vector of year dummies and e is the error
term.
4 Results
Figure 1 offers a first look at the family gap across the thirty five countries in
our sample. In the figure, we plot the family gap computed using the
methodology described in Section 3 (FAMILYGAP) against the family gap in
the raw data, i.e., allowing the set of observable characteristics to vary across
countries and groups of women.
From the figure we can see that there is a positive correlation between the two
measures of the family gap (the correlation coefficient is .52). The negative
values for some countries and years disappear when we impose the US level of
observable characteristics of mothers and non-mothers to the rest of countries,
an indication that some of these negative values were driven by the different
characteristics of mothers and non-mothers in those countries rather than the
returns to those characteristics. As we argued before, we think that this is an
advantage of our methodology, because it is hard to draw conclusions from the
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different distributions of characteristics across countries, considering the small
size of some of the samples in the ISSP data set.7
Figure 1
Family gap. Fitted values versus raw data. ISSP data.
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Table 4
Average family and gender gaps, male wage compression
FAMILYGAP GENDERGAP SD SDRES
Southern Europe .3560 .2864 .3136 .4792
Liberal .3196 .3971 .4370 .4727
Continental .2432 .3091 .3548 .4664
Nordic .2088 .2602 .3245 .4810
Other .1065 .4175 .3792 .4866
Eastern .1404 .3080 .3261 .4857
Note:  FAMILYGAP and GENDERGAP are respectively the predicted family gap and gender gap evaluated at
U.S. values for mother and non-mother, men and women characteristics; SD is the standard deviation
of predicted log wages applying each country’s male wage equation to U.S. men; SDRES is the
standard deviation of each country’s male log wage residuals calculated from its male wage equation.
Table 4 shows the average family gap and the two measures of wage dispersion
for the five groups of countries in our sample. For comparison purposes, the
7.  The three observations with negative numbers in FAMILYGAP correspond to Philippines 2002,
Czech Republic 2002 and Taiwan 2002. When we dropped these observations the results we
obtained were practically identical, although the fit of the various models was slightly lower.
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table also shows the earnings gap between men and women, the gender gap,
calculated with identical methodology as the family gap. The table indicates that
Southern European countries have the largest family gap, even though the
gender gap is relatively small there. More generally, there is only a weak
correlation between the family and the gender gaps (the correlation coefficient
between the two is only .1017), which suggests that the impact of the various
labor market policies in each gap might be quite different.
Table 5
OLS Regression results – Male wage compression
Dependent Variable = FAMILYGAP Dependent Variable = GENDERGAP
Coeff. t-stat (SE) Coeff.
t-stat
(SE) Coeff.
t-stat
(SE) Coeff. t-stat (SE)
SD .2986 1.14
(.2622)
.3242 1.21
(.2683)
.3427 1.80
(.1901)
.3696 1.91
(.1939)
SDRES 1.1529 .54
(2.1321)
1.2104 .79
(1.5408)
Year
dummies
YES YES YES YES
Sample size 54 54 54 54
R2 .12 .12 .15 .16
Note:  SD is the standard deviation of predicted log wages applying each country’s male wage equation to US
men. SDRES is the standard deviation of each country’s male log wage residuals calculated from its male wage
equations.
Table  5  shows  the  results  for  the  OLS  estimation  of  equation  (3).  The  table
indicates that higher wage dispersion – higher returns to observable and
unobservable characteristics – is associated to a higher gender gap but only
weakly associated to a higher family gap. Residual inequality is not statistically
significant for both gaps and the standard deviation of wages is statistically
significant at the 10% level in the case of the gender gap and at the 25% level in
the case of the family gap. One possible explanation of the results in Table 5 is
that labor market institutions are more effective at setting a wage floor in the
case of women in general than in the case of mothers in particular. In dual labor
markets high-tenure and high-experience workers benefit from social policies
disproportionately compared to low-tenure and low-experience workers. It has
been argued that unions fight harder for insiders than outsiders. Also, in some
countries, Spain being an example, the severance package grows with tenure and
both the duration and replacement rate of unemployment benefits grows with
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job market experience, giving high-tenure and high-experience workers more
power to reject wage cuts or even bargain for a wage increase.
Another explanation is that mothers accumulate less human capital in the
presence of labor market institutions that compress wages, something that could
happen if wage compressing institutions lead to unemployment and this causes
mothers who transition out of the labor market to go through long
unemployment spells.
In Tables 6 to 8 we show the results of estimating various reduced form
specifications where, instead of the male wage dispersion measures we include
proxies for labor market institutions which can affect wage compression overall
and the family gap in particular.
Table 6 shows the results for the group of what we call tenure enhancing
policies: the duration of parental leave (LEAVEWKS), the replacement rate of
earnings while in parental leave (LVREP), the protection of regular jobs
(PROTREG) and restrictions to the use of temporary contracts by firms
(RESTRICTEMP). Across all specifications, each of these policies is associated
to a lower family gap, i.e., the more generous parental leave, the stricter the
restrictions to job termination and the stricter the restrictions on the use of
temporary contracts, the lower the family gap. The significance of parental leave
duration is greater than that of its replacement rate and when parental leave is
combined with job protection the fit of the model improves although the impact
of parental leave falls and becomes insignificant. The effect of job protection
and of restrictions to the use of temporary contracts is large and highly
significant in all specifications. For example, using the coefficients in the
complete specification, if the group of Liberal countries had the same level of
job protection of regular jobs as the group of Nordic countries, the family gap
would fall in the former by 21.9% or .07 log points. Also, if Southern European
countries had the same duration of parental leave as Nordic countries, the family
gap would fall in the former by .048 log points or 13.4%.
Table 6
Results for parental leave and job protection. OLS regressions
FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP
Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE)
LVWEEKS
-.0030
-1.87
(.0016)
-.0025
-1.37
(.0018)
-.0017
-.98
(.0017)
-.0027
-1.65
(.0016)
-.0023
-1.25
(.0018)
LVREP
-.0005
-.64
(.0008)
-.0004
-.53
(.0008)
PROTREG
-.0578
-2.27
(.0255)
-.0679
-2.57
(.0264)
-.0558
-1.85
(.0301)
-.0165
-.62
(.0266)
-.0068
-.25
(.0276)
RESTRICTEMP
-.0173
-1.32
(.0131)
-.0166
-1.23
(.0134)
.0166
1.21
(.0137)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 38 37 40 40 38 38 37 40 40
R2 .15 .17 .17 .21 .25 .16 .17 .11 .14
Note:  LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. - PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index
of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is).
19
Overall, these results indicate that policies that help mothers continue with the
same employer/job after childbirth reduce the wage penalty associated to
motherhood. It should be recalled that the effect of parental leave on the family
gap is theoretically ambiguous, since generous parental leave might induce
mothers to stay out of employment for longer periods of time than otherwise,
with the corresponding loss of experience. The results in Table 6 confirm those
obtained by previous studies using British and U.S. data (Waldfogel 1995,
Waldfogel 1998), and suggest that the net effect of parental leave on human
capital is a positive one.
The comparison between the family and the gender gap in Table 6 indicates that
while parental leave is associated to a lower gender gap, the protection of jobs
bears  no  relation  with  it.  These  results  are  intuitive.  Whereas  women  tend  to
benefit disproportionately, compared to men, from parental leave policies,
instead, job protection regulations and restrictions on the use of temporary
contracts are important for both men and women.
We turn now to the analysis of wage compressing institutions. Table 7 shows the
results for collective bargaining coverage. We look at two measures of collective
bargaining coverage: the percentage of the work force directly or indirectly
affected by unions’ agreements (COVERAGE)8 and the ranking of countries in
relation to trade union coverage (RANK). The reason for including this second
measure is that the O.E.C.D. reported measure of trade union coverage is top
coded for some countries. The RANK variable however, is insignificant and we
dropped it from all except the initial specification. Looking at the impact of
trade union coverage on the family gap, the results in the table indicate that
more powerful unions are associated to a bigger family gap, since the sign of the
coefficient is positive across all specifications.
8.  This measure is normally bigger than trade union density, which measures the percentage of
workers directly affiliated to unions or directly represented by them.
Table 7
Results for collective bargaining coverage. OLS regression
FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP
Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE)
COVERAGE
.0004
.45
(.0010)
.0011
.83
(.0013)
.0010
1.01
(.0010)
.0016
1.49
(.0011)
-.0030
-3.67
(.0008)
-.0030 -3.13
(.0009)
RANK
-.1137
-.75
(.1512)
PROTREG
-.0838
-2.83
(.0296)
-.0684
-2.17
(.0314)
RESTRICTEMP
-.0291
-1.82
(.0160)
-.0262
-1.62
(.0161)
LVWEEKS
-.0028
-1.55
(.0018)
-.0009
-.56
(.0016)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 34 34 34 32 34 32
R2 .05 .07 .29 .37 .34 .36
Note: LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. - PROTREG is the index of strictness of
protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the higher the index the
more difficult this is).  COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. RANK is the ranking of
countries from the lowest level of trade union coverage to the highest.
21
Furthermore, the magnitude and the significance of the coefficient grow as we
include other covariates such as parental leave policies and job protection
regulations. The reason for this is that in our sample of countries there exists a
positive correlation between trade union coverage, parental leave and job
protection regulations (see Table 3), and the effect of trade union coverage on
the family gap is opposed to that of parental leave and job protection. In the last
specification, not only the size and the significance of the trade union coefficient
grows, but also that of the parental leave and job protection coefficients,
compared to Table 6. Furthermore, combining these four policies in the same
specification  improves  the  fit  of  the  model,  which  now  explains  37%  of  the
variation in the family gap across time and across countries.9 With respect to the
size of the COVERAGE coefficient, the results in the table indicate that if, for
example, Southern European countries had the same level of trade union
coverage as the group of Liberal countries then the family gap would fall in the
former by .057 log points or 16%.
With respect to the effect of trade union coverage on the gender gap, Table 7
shows an important contrast, since trade union coverage is associated to a bigger
family gap but to a lower gender gap. The negative effect of trade union
coverage on the gender gap is very strong in magnitude and significance, even
when we control for parental leave, confirming the results of previous studies
(Blau and Kahn 2003). This result confirms our previous intuition that unions
fight harder for the job market prospects of men and women than for mothers in
particular. If mothers have a weaker attachment to the labor market due to their
relatively high turnover rates (Anderson et al. 2003, Data & Smith 2002, Phipps
et al. 2001, Klerman & Leibowitz 1994), and if unions protect insiders more
than outsiders (Lindbeck & Snower 2001), then unions will have a negligible
effect on the family gap but not on the gender gap. However, the fact that the
sign of the coefficient in the case of the family gap is positive and significant
suggests that unions have an additional negative impact on the family gap. It is
possible that unions, while raising the relative wage of those at the bottom of the
9.  It should be noted that the number of observations changes across the different specifications.
This is due to the fact that we have information on a specific covariate for some countries but not
for others. We ran the same regressions limiting our sample to the set of countries for which
information on all covariates exists, and the results we obtained were practically identical to the
ones shown in the tables.
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wage distribution, women in general, also lead to unemployment which hits
particularly strong those with a weaker attachment to the labor market, such as
mothers. The fact that female unemployment rates are positively correlated to
both trade union coverage (the correlation coefficient is .59 in our sample) and
to the size of the family gap, supports this hypothesis. The results in Table 7 are
also important to understand the apparently weak association between the family
and the gender gaps across countries, something that is not surprising
considering that labor market institutions have a different impact on the two
gaps and that there is variation of labor market institutions across countries.
Table 8 shows the results for the other two wage compressing institutions:
unemployment benefits and the minimum wage. As with the case of collective
bargaining coverage, unemployment benefits are associated to a bigger family
gap. In all specifications the coefficient is bigger than its standard error and in
two of the three specifications is significant at the 5% level. The magnitude and
significance  of the  coefficient grows  as  other  covariates  are  included  in  the
model (also because of the positive correlation between institutions and their
different effect on the family gap). As for the magnitude of the coefficient, if
Nordic countries had the lower level of unemployment benefits of the group of
Liberal countries, the family gap would decrease in the former by .10 log points
or 49.9%. Adding the unemployment benefits variable to the model improves its
fit, explaining now 41% of the variation of the family gap across time and
countries. As in the case of collective bargaining coverage, an intuitive
explanation  of  this  result  is  that  while  unemployment  benefits  may  raise  the
relative  wage  of  mothers  allowing  them  to  find  a  better  match,  they  may  also
encourage mothers to stay out of the labor market longer than otherwise, with
the corresponding loss of job market experience. We have to recall here that the
correlation coefficient between the generosity of unemployment benefits and the
female unemployment rate in our sample is .14. The results for the minimum
wage indicate that this variable is not related to the family gap, although we
should note that we were able to construct this variable for only ten of the thirty
five countries in our sample. In relation to the effect of unemployment benefits
and the minimum wage on the gender gap, Table 8 indicates that the minimum
wage has a strongly significant and negative impact on the gender gap and that
the level of unemployment benefits is not significantly related to the gender gap.
Table 8
Results for unemployment benefits and the minimum wage. OLS regression
FAMILY GAP GENDER GAP
Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE)
UBENEFITS
.3933
2.96
(.1326)
.4794
2.67
(.1795)
.5898
1.23
(.4777)
-.0697
-.64
(.1086)
.2508
.91
(.2748)
.5512
1.24
(.4455)
MINWAGE
-.0511
-.14
(.3537)
-.9942
-2.67
(.3725)
LVWEEKS
-.0038
-2.13
(.0018)
-.0045
-1.99
(.0022)
-.0024
-1.20
(.0020)
PROTREG
-.0560
-2.03
(.0276)
-.0633
-2.01
(.0314)
RESTRICTEMP
-.0312
-2.32
(.0135)
-.0258
-1.61
(.0160)
COVERAGE
.0013
1.20
(.0011)
-.0034
-3.71
(.0009)
-.0032
-3.35
(.0009)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 52 38 32 17 52 34 32 17
R2 .25 .39 .41 .15 .09 .36 .40 .47
Note: LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is
for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts (the higher the index the more difficult this is).  UBENEFITS is an index indicating the generosity of unemployment
benefits. MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage. COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union
arrangements.
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Overall, the results in tables 6-8 indicate that policies that help mothers continue
with the same employer/job after childbirth reduce the family gap, whereas
policies aimed at raising the relative wage of mothers increase the family gap.
As mentioned before, one possible explanation for this is that wage compressing
policies lead to rigid labor markets with high unemployment rates, which
increases the length of spells out of employment by mothers around childbirth.
Unfortunately, the ISSP data does not give information on the duration of spells
out of employment around childbirth, so we cannot directly test this hypothesis.
However, there is some indirect evidence that tends to support it. This evidence
is shown in Table 9 and in Table 10. Table 9 displays the correlation coefficients
across countries between the level of trade union coverage, unemployment
benefits, the probability of a job interruption around childbirth and the
percentage of women under part-time employment. In the ISSP data,
approximately forty percent of mothers answered to the following question:
“Did you stop working right after your child was born and during pre-school
period?” For these mothers there is also information as to whether they were or
not working before childbirth. Combining these two questions we calculated the
probability that a mother interrupted her career because of a child spell
(JOBINTERRUPT).
Table 9
Job interruptions, COVERAGE, UBENEFITS, Part-time employment. Correlation coefficients. ISSP
data and Institutions data
JOBINTERRUPT PART-TIME UBENEFITS COVERAGE URATE-FEMALE
JOBINTERRUPT 1.0000
PART-TIME .8016 1.0000
UBENEFITS -.5832 -.2474 1.0000
COVERAGE -.5025 -.3377 .5679 1.0000
URATE-
FEMALE
-.4092 -.4789 .1391 .5949 1.0000
Table 9 shows that in countries with a higher level of trade union coverage and
more generous unemployment benefits, women face higher unemployment rates,
mothers tend to interrupt their careers less frequently and are rarely employed in
part-time jobs. This is clearly consistent with a picture of rigid, ‘sclerotic’, labor
markets in which mothers who transition out of employment either voluntarily
or involuntarily because of a child spell may suffer a relatively long period of
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joblessness.10 In Table 10 we break the family gap in equation (2) in two
components. The first component is a proxy for the price effect associated to
motherhood. We construct this price effect by removing from the family gap the
impact of variables which we think are correlated with the job market
experience and the tenure of mothers and non-mothers, i.e., potential experience
(POTEXP), part-time status (PART), job interruption controls (JOBINTER-
RUPT) and the number of kids (KIDS). The price effect component is then,
( ) ( ) UStEDMjtEDNMjtMjtNMjtjt educBBbbPRICEFFECT ×-+-= 00 (5)
where the coefficients are estimated as in equation (1). The price effect is then
the sum of two terms. The second term measures the difference in the returns to
education between mothers and non-mothers ( )EDMjtEDNMjt BB - . Note that in this
second term, we set the level of education to be the same for mothers and non-
mothers and across countries, at the US level. This is then, a pure price effect
due to a different price of education for mothers compared to non-mothers. The
first term is the difference in the constant terms for mothers and non-mothers
and is supposed to measure the extent the returns to unobserved characteristics
are also different between mothers and non-mothers. The human capital effect is
simply the difference between the family gap in equation (2) and the price
effect:
jtjtjt PRICEFFECTFAMILYGAPHCEFFECT -= (6)
Table 10
Price effect versus human capital effect. OLS regression
PRICEFFECT HCEFFECT
Coeff t Coeff t
UBENEFITS -3.7061 -1.02 3.7255 1.03
COVERAGE -.0130 -1.33 .0154 1.58
PROTREG .1032 .45 -.1756 -.77
RESTRICTEMP -.0295 -.27 -.0031 -.03
LVWEEKS .0246 1.50 -.0266 -1.63
R2 .23 .29
The results shown in Table 10 should be taken with caution. Given that in the
ISSP data we cannot measure job market tenure, it is possible that variables
10.  Del Boca et al (2003) and Adserà (2002) argue that in such labor markets women delay their
fertility decisions until they have secured an indefinite contract that protects them against the
possibility of being laid off because of a child spell.
26
included in the PRICEFFECT component capture to some extent the human
capital effect due to motherhood, and vice versa. Despite the data limitations we
face, the results are broadly consistent with our previous intuition. In the case of
the wage compressing institutions, the coefficients are always bigger than its
standard errors for both the price and the human capital effects and have a
negative sign in the case of the price effect but a positive one in the case of the
human capital effect. In other words, according to the results in the table, wage
compressing institutions reduce the gap between mothers and non-mothers with
respect to the returns on a given set of skills, however, these institutions cause
mothers to lose job market experience relative to non-mothers, which increases
the family gap. In the case of the tenure enhancing institutions, as expected, all
these institutions are associated to a lower human capital effect, although only
the parental leave variable remains significant. With respect to this last variable,
the table also indicates that parental leave is associated to higher price effect.
Table 11
Accounting for the difference in the family gap
Log points difference with the average of all countries due to:
Region Family Gap Parental
Leave
Job
Protection
Temporary
Contracts
Trade Union
Coverage
Unemployment
Benefits
Tenure
Enhancing
Wage
Compressing
Total
Difference
Southern .360 .002 -.035 .075 .025 -.002 .042 .023 .066
Liberal .349 .066 .080 -.042 -.023 -.027 .104 -.050 .055
Continental .302 .027 -.024 .007 .023 -.025 .010 -.002 .008
Other .278 .033 -.021 .010 -.060 .022 .022 -.038 -.016
Nordic .247 -.126 -.017 .008 .025 .062 -.135 .087 -.048
Eastern .183 -.015 -.041 -.022 -.035 .001 -.078 -.034 -.111
Note: FAMILY GAP are the fitted values using the coefficients of a regression of the family gap against parental leave, job protection regulation, restrictions on the use of
temporary contracts, trade union coverage, unemployment benefits and year dummies, but omitting the effect of year dummies. TOTAL DIFFERENCE is the log-points
difference in the family gap between a specific group of countries and the average of all countries in our sample.
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Table 11 decomposes the impact of each one of the labor market institutions in
determining the family gap in each group of countries. The table shows the log
points difference between the family gap in one group of countries and the
sample average due to each of the labor market institutions. The family gap in
the first column is the fitted values of the family gap in a regression against
parental leave, job protection regulation, restrictions on the use of temporary
contracts, trade union coverage, unemployment benefits and year dummies,
subtracting from the fitted value the effect of the year dummies. The contrast
between the group of Liberal and Nordic countries is particularly interesting.
The former are representative of flexible, unregulated labor markets with a
relatively low level of almost all labor market institutions, with the exception of
restrictions to temporary contracts. Instead, the Nordic countries are the typical
example of regulated labor markets with a relatively high level of almost all the
labor market institutions. Since the effect of the two groups of labor market
policies on the family gap is of opposite sign, Liberal countries benefit from the
relatively low level of wage compressing policies, but get hurt by the relatively
low level of tenure enhancing policies. Just the opposite story can be said in
relation to the group of Nordic countries. The group of Southern European
countries displays the typical picture of dual labor markets, with two
differentiated segments, one heavily protected by strict firing restrictions, and
possibly by unions, and the other subject to temporary, easy to terminate,
contracts.  This  particular  combination  of  policies  seems  to  be  the  worst  in
relation to the family gap, since both the relatively low level of tenure enhancing
policies (mainly due to the lax regulation of temporary contracts) and the
relatively high level of wage compressing policies contribute to the large gap in
Southern European countries, which is 26% higher than the sample mean.
5 Robustness Tests
In  tables  12  to  14  we  test  the  robustness  of  our  results  throughout  different
specifications, by including additional controls and changing the way we
compute the family gap. For comparison purposes, the first column in Table 12
and the first two columns in Table 13 present our earlier results. In Table 12 we
show the magnitude of the family gap across different specifications of step 1 of
our methodology (equations (1) and (2)). FAMILYGAP2 is the family gap
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estimated from individual earnings regressions on mothers and non-mothers
including two additional controls that could be correlated with the family gap
and the labor market institutions variables: a control for whether the mother
stopped working around childbirth (JOBINTERRUPT) and a control for public
sector employment (INPUBLIC). In FAMILYGAP2 the job interruption
controls are allowed to vary by country, since the proportion of mothers that
stop working around childbirth is potentially affected by the set of labor market
regulations in each country. FAMILYGAP2 is then obtained from the following
equation:
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where the coefficients are obtained from individual wage regressions such as,
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Finally, in the last column of the table, FAMILYGAP3 is the earnings gap
between mothers and non-mothers assuming that mothers and non-mothers have
the same levels of observable characteristics, except for the kids and job
interruption controls which are mother specific:
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According to FAMILYGAP3, given that mothers and non-mothers have the
same levels of observable characteristics, the main reason for a family gap is
that  the  returns  to  the  same  skills  are  different  between  mothers  and  non-
mothers.
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Table 12
Family Gap in Pay. Different Specifications
(1)
FAMILYGAP
(2)
FAMILYGAP2
(3)
FAMILYGAP3
Southern .356 .415 .269
Liberal .319 .319 .190
Continental .243 .268 .155
Nordic .208 .210 .120
Eastern .140 .103 -.010
Other .106 .246 .069
Difference in
characteristics between
mothers and non-mothers
YES YES NO
JOBINTERRUPT NO YES YES
INPUBLIC NO YES YES
The numbers in Table 12 show that, when additional controls are included, the
difference in the family gap across countries grows, with the gap increasing in
countries with an already large family gap and decreasing in countries with a
relatively low family gap. The ranking of countries remains the same, with
Southern European countries showing the biggest wage penalty for mothers,
followed by the group of Liberal countries, Continental European countries, and
Nordic countries. Also, and as one should expect, the magnitude of the family
gap falls in all groups of countries in column 3, when we remove the difference
in observable characteristics between mothers and non-mothers. But still in the
case of FAMILYGAP3, the ranking of countries is the same as before. Overall,
the results in table 12 show that the difference in the family gap in pay across
countries  is  quite  robust  to  the  specification  changes  in  step  1  of  our
methodology.
In  Table  13  we  test  the  robustness  of  the  results  for  step  2  across  different
specifications. In columns 2 and 3, we run regressions on the same vector of
labor market institutions as before but now including as dependent variable
FAMILYGAP2 and FAMILYGAP3, respectively. In column 4, we regress
FAMILYGAP against an alternative measure of unemployment benefits
(SOCIALSEC), trade union power (COLLREL), and job protection regulations
(EMPLAW). These new measures of labor market institutions come from
Botero et al., (2004). SOCIALSEC stands for Social Security Laws Index and
measures social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and
death benefits; (2) Sickness and health benefits; and (3) Unemployment benefits.
COLLREL stands for Collective Relations Law Index and measures the
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protection of collective relations laws as the average of: (1) Labor union power;
and (2) Collective disputes. EMPLAW stands for Employment Laws Index, and
measures the protection of labor and employment laws as the average of: (1)
Alternative employment contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours worked; (3) Cost
of firing workers; and (4) Dismissal procedures.
Table 13
Results for various specifications. OLS regression
(1)
FAMILYGAP
(2)
FAMILYGAP2
(3)
FAMILYGAP3
(4)
FAMILYGAP
Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t
UBENEFITS .5898 1.23 .8075 1.56 .3942 .63
COVERAGE .0013 1.20 .0014 1.17 .0015 1.01
PROTREG -.0633 -2.01 -.0620 -1.82 -.0545 -1.34
RESTRICTEMP -.0258 -1.61 -.0442 -2.54 -.0385 -1.85 -.0181 -1.03
LVWEEKS -.0045 -1.99 -.0058 -2.36 -.0033 -1.12 -.0054 -2.47
SOCIALSEC .9778 2.54
COLLREL .0287 .13
EMPLAW -.1051 -.58
R2 .40 .49 .35 .32
Difference in
characteristics
between mothers and
non-mothers
YES YES NO YES
JOBINTERRUPT NO YES YES NO
INPUBLIC NO YES YES NO
The numbers in Table 13 show that the effect of labor market institutions on the
family gap is very robust to changes in the specification of the dependent and
independent variables. When additional controls are included (FAMILYGAP2),
the fit of the model improves and both the significance and the magnitude of the
coefficients grow. Under this specification, we are able now to explain 49% of
the variation of the family gap across time and countries. In the case of
FAMILYGAP3, not surprisingly, the magnitude and significance of the
coefficients fall (we are removing differences in observables between mothers
and non-mothers as a source for the gap) but wage compressing institutions
continue to be associated to a bigger family gap and tenure enhancing
institutions to a lower one. In column 4, the new measures of labor market
institutions have a similar impact on the family gap as the ones they replace,
with  a  particularly  strong  effect  for  the  SOCIALSEC  variable.  It  should  be
noted, that these new measures of institutions are aggregates of measures that
we previously disaggregated (for example, the EMPLAW measure is an average
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of job protection and restrictions to the use of alternative – possibly temporary –
contracts), so it is not surprising that the fit of the model and the significance of
the coefficients fall in column 4 compared to the other columns.
Table 14
Results for the Southern effect. OLS regressions
FAMILYGAP
Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE) Coeff t. (SE)
LVWEEKS
-.0014
-.83
(.0017)
-.0014
-.82
(.0017)
-.0042
-1.85
(.0023)
PROTREG
-.0700
-2.84
(.0246)
-.0605
-2.12
(.0285)
-.0612
-2.08
(.0294)
-.0653
-2.06
(.0316)
RESTRICTEMP
-.0026
-.17
(.0153)
-.0151
-.76
(.0200)
COVERAGE
.0013
1.14
(.0011)
UBENEFITS
.6042
1.26
(.4801)
SOUTHERN
.1707
2.32
(.0736)
.1643
2.18
(.0755)
.1562
1.73
(.0901)
.0874
.89
(.0984)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample size 40 38 38 32
R2 .28 .31 .32 .42
Note – LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of
regular jobs. RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts
(the higher the index the more difficult this is).  COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or
indirectly by trade union arrangements. UBENEFITS is an index measuring the generosity of social benefits to
the unemployed. SOUTHERN is a dummy variable with value 1 for Portugal, Spain and Italy.
Since the family gap in Southern European countries is remarkably bigger than
anywhere else across all specifications, in Table 14 we test the robustness of our
previous results to the inclusion of a Southern Effect. It is possible, for example,
that cultural factors explain the relatively large family gap in Southern European
countries. If these cultural factors are correlated with the set of labor market
institutions  in  these  countries,  then  it  is  possible  that  all  we  are  doing  is  to
capture a Southern effect through the coefficients on the labor market
institutions variables. We ask, then, to what extent our previous results are
driven by extreme values of the Southern European countries. Table 14 indicates
that as more variables are included in the specification, both the magnitude and
the significance of the Southern effect fall. In the last specification, considering
all the labor market institutions, the Southern effect loses its significance and,
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with the exception of RESTRICTEMP, the magnitude and significance of the
labor  market  institutions  controls  remains  remarkably  similar  to  the  ones  we
obtained before. The table suggests, then, that the Southern effect is nothing else
than  the  combined  effect  of  the  set  of  labor  market  policies  in  Southern
European countries.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have estimated the family gap in thirty five countries and have
looked and the role of labor market institutions in explaining the cross-country
differences in this gap. Our approach has been based on the hypothesis that a
distinguishing feature of mothers is their need to transition in and out of the
labor market around childbirth and that labor market institutions affect both the
probability and the length on such transitions.
We have found that the wage penalty associated to motherhood varies
significantly across countries. We found that mothers in Southern Europe suffer
a wage penalty up to two times as large as mothers in Nordic countries.
An important result of this study is that there is not much of a relation between
the family and the gender gaps across countries. We found that often labor
market institutions have opposite effects on these two sources of wage
inequality and that hence the task of designing optimal policies to reduce both is
not straightforward. In particular, our results indicate that protecting mothers
against contract termination, either by use of parental leave or job protection
regulations, would be the most effective way of reducing the earnings gap
between mothers and non-mothers but also between men and women. Instead,
policies traditionally associated to wage compression, although effective at
lowering the gender gap, might lead to an increase in the wage gap between
mothers and women without children. Our interpretation of these results is that
an important reason mothers lag behind other women in terms of earnings is the
loss of accumulated job market experience due to job transitions around
childbirth. Furthermore, to the extent many women are also mothers, this is also
an important reason for the wage gap between women and men.
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Finally, we compared and ranked groups of countries according to the
magnitude of the family and the gender gaps. We found that mothers in
Southern European countries suffer the highest family gap, although the gender
gap is relatively low there. An important research question is how much of the
extremely low fertility rates in Southern European countries (Adserà 2004, Del
Boca et al 2003) can be explained by the high family gap. Also, the data we used
in this study is cross-sectional and hence is not well suited to study in detail the
frequency and length of job transitions that mothers go through around
childbirth. Longitudinal datasets would be the natural alternative and we think
that an important research topic is to look in more detail at the impact of labor
market institutions on job transitions by mothers.
Appendix: Data
TENURE ENHANCING POLICIES WAGE COMPRESSING POLICIES
LVWEEKS
(weeks)1
LVREP
(%)1
PROTREG
(index)2
RESTRICTEMP
(index)3
COVERAGE
(%)4
UBENEFITS
(index)5
MINWAGE
(%)6
1999-01 1999-01 80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 90s 1986 2000
SOUTHERN 20.6 93.3 3.5 2.9 2.9 0.9 1.6 2.0 70.0 73.3 80.0 0.80 0.53 0.35
CONTINENTAL 15.5 95.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 2.6 77.5 79.1 77.1 0.75 0.58 0.52
LIBERAL 8.0 28.5 0.9 1.1 1.2 3.5 3.5 3.3 59.0 49.5 37.25 0.71 0.48 0.47
NORDIC 47.0 83.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.6 2.6 77.5 77.5 82.5 0.89 0.59 NA
EASTERN 24.5 89.7 NA 2.7 2.7 NA 1.5 1.4 NA NA 36.2 0.81 NA 0.40
OTHER 13.0 80.0 2.4 2.3 2.3 0.28 0.31 0.37 25.0 20.0 15.0 0.51 0.29 0.33
Notes:
SOUTHERN countries are Portugal, Italy and Spain. CONTINENTAL countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, W. Germany and Switzerland. LIBERAL countries
are Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S. NORDIC countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. EASTERN countries are the Czech Republic, E. Germany,
Latvia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. OTHER countries are Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan.
1LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001). Data is for the
1999-2001 period.
2PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs; the higher the index, the stricter the protection against the dismissal of workers in regular jobs. Source:
O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).
3RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts. It indicates the number of valid cases for temporary contracts other than the
usual objective reasons; the higher the index the more difficult is for firms to use temporary contracts. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).
4COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).
5UBENEFITS is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits. The
higher the index the more generous unemployment benefits are. Source: Botero et al., (2004).
6MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in each country. Source: O.E.C.D. Minimum Wage Database.
LVWEEKS
(weeks)
LVREP
(%)
PROTREG
(index)
RESTRICTEMP
(index)
COVERGAE
(%)
UBENEFITS
(index)
MINWAGE
(%)
1999-01 1999-01 80S 90S 00S 80s 90s 00s 80s 90s 00s 90s 1986 2000
Australia 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.50 1.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 80.00 80.00 80.00 0.79 0.63 0.58
Austria 16.00 100.00 2.90 2.90 2.40 2.75 2.75 2.75 95.00 95.00 95.00 0.63
Brasil 0.56
Bulgaria 0.84
Chile 0.73
Cyprus
Czech 28.00 69.00 3.30 3.30 3.25 3.25 25.00 0.74 0.31
Denmark 30.00 100.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 2.25 3.25 3.25 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.90 0.62
Finland 52.00 70.00 2.80 2.30 2.20 2.50 2.50 2.50 90.00 90.00 90.00 0.91
Flanders 15.00 77.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.00 2.25 2.25 90.00 90.00 90.00 0.86 0.57 0.49
France 16.00 100.00 2.30 2.30 2.50 1.75 1.50 1.50 80.00 90.00 90.00 0.82 0.63 0.62
GermanyE
GermanyW 14.00 100.00 2.60 2.70 2.70 2.00 2.75 2.75 80.00 80.00 68.00 0.78 0.59
Hungary 24.00 100.00 . 1.90 1.90 3.25 3.25 30.00 0.78 0.50
Ireland 14.00 70.00 1.60 1.60 1.60 3.50 3.50 3.25 0.76 0.56
Israel 0.85
Italy 21.50 80.00 1.80 1.80 1.80 0.25 1.00 2.50 80.00 80.00 80.00 0.73 0.75
Japan 14.00 60.00 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.00 2.25 2.75 25.00 20.00 15.00 0.82 0.29 0.33
Latvia 0.80
Mexico 12.00 100.00 2.30 2.30 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00
Netherlands 16.00 100.00 3.10 3.10 3.10 3.00 3.25 3.25 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.68 0.56 0.47
NewZEaland 1.40 1.70 3.50 3.50 3.00 60.00 60.00 25.00 0.56 0.47 0.46
Norway 42.00 100.00 2.30 2.30 2.30 1.25 1.50 1.50 70.00 70.00 70.00 0.82
Philippines 0.00
Poland 18.00 100.00 2.20 2.20 3.50 2.50 40.00 0.83 0.38
Portugal 24.30 100.00 4.80 4.30 4.30 1.50 2.00 2.00 70.00 70.00 80.00 0.85 0.47 0.38
Russia 0.90
Slovak 28.00 90.00 3.60 3.50 3.25 3.50 50.00 0.79 0.41
Slovenia 0.86
Spain 16.00 100.00 3.90 2.60 2.60 1.00 2.00 1.75 60.00 70.00 80.00 0.81 0.37 0.32
LVWEEKS
(weeks)
LVREP
(%)
PROTREG
(index)
RESTRICTEMP
(index)
COVERGAE
(%)
UBENEFITS
(index)
MINWAGE
(%)
Sweden 64.00 63.00 2.90 2.90 2.90 1.00 3.25 3.25 80.00 80.00 90.00 0.94 0.57
Swiss 16.00 1.20 1.20 1.20 3.50 3.50 3.50 50.00 50.00 40.00 0.74
Taiwan 0.67
Uk 18.00 44.00 0.90 0.90 1.10 3.50 3.50 3.50 70.00 40.00 30.00 0.78 0.46 0.42
US 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 3.50 3.50 3.50 26.00 18.00 14.00 0.66 0.37 0.36
Notes:
SOUTHERN countries are Portugal, Italy and Spain. CONTINENTAL countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Netherlands, W. Germany and Switzerland. LIBERAL countries
are Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S. NORDIC countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. EASTERN countries are the Czech Republic, E. Germany,
Latvia, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia and Slovenia. OTHER countries are Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Philippines and Taiwan.
1LVWEEKS is the number of weeks for parental leave. LVREP is the replacement rate during parental leave. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2001). Data is for the
1999-2001 period.
2PROTREG is the index of strictness of protection of regular jobs; the higher the index, the stricter the protection against the dismissal of workers in regular jobs. Source:
O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).
3RESTRICTEMP is an index of how difficult is for firms to hire workers under temporary contracts. It indicates the number of valid cases for temporary contracts other than the
usual objective reasons; the higher the index the more difficult is for firms to use temporary contracts. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).
4COVERAGE is the percentage of employees affected directly or indirectly by trade union arrangements. Source: O.E.C.D. Employment Outlook (2004).
5UBENEFITS is a one-time index of the generosity of unemployment benefits, combining information on the replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits. The
higher the index the more generous unemployment benefits are. Source: Botero et al., (2004).
6MINWAGE is the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage in each country. Source: O.E.C.D. Minimum Wage Database.
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